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Does the Speed of Change over the House Price Cycles Matter? 
Belgin Akçay and Eray Yucel* 
Abstract 
Housing price boom-bust cycles lied at the heart of the latest global financial crisis. Many 
countries experienced booms from 2000 to 2006 which turned into bursts at about the 
same period, leading to a crisis of global scale. As housing booms are defined as periods 
in which housing price exceeds its fundamental value, the earlier literature devised 
several approaches to identify and analyze housing price cycles. Those studies have been 
successful in finding associations between housing price booms-busts and a number of 
macroeconomic indicators. However, the speed of change of house prices over the cycles 
remained untouched. So we aim at identifying housing price episodes with special 
emphasis placed on the pace of price changes and we document associations between 
housing cycles, macroeconomic factors and financial development for 26 countries. Our 
finding that these associations depend on the speed of change of prices over the housing 
price cycles rather than being uniform might be indicative of a missed spot in 
understanding housing price bubbles and policy design. 
Keywords: House prices; Boom-bust cycles; Macroeconomic factors; Financial 
development; Speed of change. 
JEL Classification: E44; C51; C58; G01. 
1.Introduction  
Up to date an array of economic crises grew with the burst of economic bubbles.  The 
United States (1984), Denmark (1987), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991), Japan 
(1992), France (1994), and the United Kingdom (1995) are some examples of countries that faced 
with boom-bust cycles in their economies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) where most of the crises 
occurred during 1980s has come about with collapses of asset prices. Despite many of asset price 
booms did not end in busts historically, following the liberalization of the markets asset price 
booms became more likely in the recent year, especially due to sizable contagion effects. As a 
matter of fact, this was verified in the cases of Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s and in the 
US in the 2000s. 
                                                 
* Akçay: Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: akcay@law.ankara.edu.tr, Yucel: (Corresponding 
author) Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey, e-mail: eray.yucel@gmail.com, eray.yucel@khas.edu.tr 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants’ comments and criticisms during the International 
AREUEA Conference, July 9-11, 2014, Reading, United Kingdom and International Conference on 
Economics - Turkish Economic Association (ICE-TEA 2014) October 18-20 2014, Antalya, Turkey. 
3 
The adverse role of asset price busts in triggering economic recessions was documented 
by IMF (2003a) regarding the boom-bust cycles of asset prices in the 1970s and 1990s. In the 
literature, the attention increasingly shifted from stock price fluctuations to real estate prices in 
2000s. This is not surprising as the housing price boom lied at the heart of the latest global crisis 
and a bigger wealth loss was caused by the housing market fluctuations than by stock market 
fluctuations. In that, Crowe’s (2012) comparison of losses during the dot-com bust where the 
value of American households’ equity holdings declined by 44 percent (USD 5.4 trillion) and the 
real estate bust that started at the end of 2006 where real estate assets declined by 15 percent (USD 
3.7 trillion) is quite insightful. IMF (2003a) finds that linkages between stock and housing prices 
within countries are very strong, as rising stock prices during a boom is likely to raise housing 
prices. Besides, half of all the housing price crashes matched the stock price busts (Figure 1). 
There is a variety of terms referring to the erratic behavior of asset prices such as ‘bubble’, 
‘boom’, ‘panic’, ‘bust’, ‘burst’, ‘crash’ and ‘irrational exuberance’. While a housing boom (or 
bubble) can be defined as a period in which housing price exceeds its fundamental value 
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Helbling, 2004; Ikromov and Yavas, 2012; Xiong, 2013) it can 
be defined with specific reference to increases in real (inflation-adjusted) housing prices and 
mortgage debt, along with persistent rental income losses (Minsky, 1992). 
The methods to identify the housing price cycles largely borrows from the business cycles 
literature, so the empirical identification of cycles is mostly based on picking plausible turning 
points where a peak is the period immediately preceding a decline and a trough is the period 
immediately preceding an upturn (Boldin, 1994). Recently, Agnello and Schuknecht (2011), Igan 
and Loungani (2012) and Corradin and Fontana (2013) have followed the method of Harding and 
Pagan (2002) and Harding (2003). IMF (2003a) used the method of Helbling (2004) who followed 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003), a slightly modified version of the NBER procedure. Bordo and 
Jeanne (2002), Phillips et al. (2007), IMF (2009) and Gerdesmeier et al. (2012), Yiu et al. (2012), 
and Gomez-Gonzales et al. (2013) can also be visited for further insight.  
Owing to its everlasting importance, in this paper we examine the associations between 
housing price cycles, macroeconomic factors and financial development. In specific, we elaborate 
the question of whether the pace of price increases or decreases matter, which is the novelty of 
our analysis. Regarding the determinants of housing price cycles, this is the first paper that relates 
housing boom-bust cycles to financial development, to the best of our knowledge. We first 
employ a slightly modified version of the dating procedure due to Ball (1994) and reveal that 
almost all of 28 countries1 considered have faced with housing price booms (26 boom countries) 
while a majority of them have experienced housing price busts (21 boom-bust countries). 
                                                 
1 The countries considered are member countries of the EU (28), Iceland, Norway and the US. Croatia, 
Poland and Romania, who are member countries of the EU, are not included in analysis due to data 
unavailability. 
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Consequently, we investigated the linkages between housing price cycles and other variables by 
means of pooled probit estimates for the period of 2000-2012.The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology and data. Section 3 analyses the 
association between housing cycles and macroeconomic/financial variables and Section 4 
concludes the study. 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
2.Methodology and Data  
2.1.Dating Procedure of House Price Cycles  
Like other studies, such as Harding and Pagan (2002), Helbling (2004) and Igan and 
Loungani (2012), we first identify the housing price cycles and then reveal the boom and bust 
periods. We use a slightly modified version of the dating procedure due to Ball (1994) to find the 
trough and peak dates of real house prices and to mark the movements of prices as “rapidly 
increasing”, “slowly increasing” and “falling”. The procedure has little complexity in comparison 
to its benefits as previously documented by Boschen and Weise (2003), Domac and Yucel (2005) 
and Vansteenkiste (2009) in their earlier works on consumer price inflation. 
Implementation is quite simple and transparent: we first construct a trend real housing 
price inflation series, for each country, as the seven-quarter centered moving average of the 
quarterly real housing price inflation rates over the period of 1995Q1-2013Q3, wherever the data 
are available. Thus, a peak (trough) of housing price inflation is defined as a period in which the 
seven-quarter centered moving average of housing price inflation is the maximum (minimum) 
within a seven-quarter symmetric window. Our choice of seven-quarters, instead of the nine-
quarters as in Ball (1994), has been driven by data limitations and it limits losses in the final 
number of observations. Once the trend housing price inflation has been computed, the trough 
and peak dates of house price are identified as dates at which trend housing price inflation is lower 
(higher) than in the preceding and succeeding three quarters. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
It is important to note that such use of the procedure due to Ball (1994) provides us with 
the periods of sustained increases of real house prices. We name these periods as episodes of 
rapidly increasing real house prices (RAPID). By definition, the housing prices keep increasing 
after the peak dates of housing price inflation until reaching a maximum. The episodes from the 
peak date of housing price inflation to the peak date of housing price are then marked as episodes 
of slowly increasing house prices (SLOW). RAPID and SLOW episodes, together, yield the price 
increase periods suggested by the four-quarter rule which has been widespread in the earlier 
literature. The major advantage of our simple approach then is the ability to distinguish the 
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increase in real house prices with respect to pace. Thus, RAPID and SLOW episodes together are 
defined as a housing price BOOM period. Once the dating of upturns has been completed, the 
marking of downturns turns out to be an easier task. A period of downturn or BUST is basically 
one with starting at the peak point of real house prices and ending at a period where house prices 
tranquil or ending at the end of available data. 
2.2.Estimation Strategy 
Once the housing price cycles have been obtained for each sample country in line with 
the previous subsection, we mapped the cycle data onto a binary scale on an annual basis. In that, 
for each of the RAPID, SLOW and BUST, we defined separate annual series of binary indicators 
following the simple rule that years with (without) the desired (i.e. examined) property are marked 
with 1 (0) for years from 2000 to 2012. In case a rapid increase episode (in quarterly data set) is 
followed by a slow increase episode within a year, that year has been marked with 1 in favor of 
slow increase. BOOM is defined as the sum of RAPID and SLOW in a straightforward manner. 
At the end, the data set was structured as a pool of 26 boom countries and 13 years running from 
2000 to 2012. Considering that many countries are included in analysis, preference over an annual 
frequency makes us to avoid complications like seasonality, which might differ across economies. 
As we focus on those years with ample global liquidity and the recent global financial crisis, our 
annual dataset for probit analysis has been constructed to cover the period of 2000-2012. 
The general form of our estimating equation isPr( 1| ) ( )
it it it
Y X F x u   , where 
it
Y  is the 
binary dependent variable which takes the value of 1 in case a desired property is observed and 0 
otherwise. 
it
x is a matrix of observable explanatory variables with its coefficient vector  , itu being 
the error vector for country i in year t . (.)F is the cumulative density function for Normal 
distribution. The argument 
it it
x u  of function (.)F is called the linear probability index. Once the 
right hand side expression is evaluated, the resulting value lies between 0 and 1 and it is nothing 
but the probability that 
it
Y is 1, i.e. occurrence of a desired property. Consequently, a positive 
(negative) coefficient estimate in indicates that an increase in the variable of concern increases 
(decreases) the likelihood of the desired property that is chosen among BOOM, RAPID, SLOW 
and BUST in this paper. For more information on the technique and the maximum likelihood 
estimation criterion see Baltagi (2005, Chapter 11). 
2.3.Data 
Prior to implementing the dating procedure, quarterly real house prices were calculated 
as the ratio of nominal house prices to consumer prices index, both seasonally adjusted, for each 
country. In seasonal adjustment we used the Census X12 procedure. The base year for the 
computed real housing prices (seasonally adjusted) was set as 2005, for visual ease, with the 
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exception of Luxembourg for which the base year was set as 2007. Sources of data and variable 
definitions are described in Table 1 and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3. Empirical Results  
3.1.House Price Cycles 
Using the methodology of subsection 2.1, we identified the boom-bust cycles displayed 
in Figure 3. All countries but Germany and Luxembourg experienced a boom and a majority of 
boom countries faced with bust (Table 3). 
Regarding the workings of our approach, data availability imposes some limitations. As 
our house price data set runs from 1995Q1 to 2013Q3, use of a seven-quarter centered moving 
average and consecutive choice of peaks and troughs based on another seven-quarter window 
cause some data loss. So we enjoyed a limited liberty to pick some peak dates at the beginning of 
data without any accompanying troughs and mark such periods as house price upturns. As 
described in subsection 2.1, we subsequently translated the identified episodes into binary 
indicators at an annual frequency so as to obtain the variables RAPID, SLOW, BOOM and BUST, 
the occurrence frequencies of which against time are provided in Figure 4. 
During rapid price increase episodes, it is observed that house prices increase by an 
average of 1% per quarter. This figure indicates an increase in nominal house prices 1 percentage 
point in excess of consumer price inflation. This kind of a behavior of prices is a serious one once 
the sustained nature of house price increases during booms is taken into account. Second, our 
boom episodes are congruent with those of Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) 59% and those of 
Igan and Loungani (2012) 89% of the time. When we consider both boom and bust episodes, 
these figures are revealed as 51% and 54%, respectively. Note that, the congruence between 
Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) and Igan and Loungani (2012) is 35% for boom periods and 23% 
for boom and bust periods together. So, despite the differences in data and dating procedures, our 
approach guarantees a sufficient overlap with the recent literature. 
Finally, based on our revealed episodes, the sample countries were classified as boom-
countries, boom-bust (BB) countries and boom-non-bust (Non-BB) countries. Here, 26 out of 28 
countries experienced housing price booms and 21 of them went into busts, and they are marked 
with BB. The remaining five countries are marked with Non-BB to indicate that their booms were 
not followed by a bust. Like many countries in the world, it was accepted that residential 
real estate markets were overvalued in the EU countries as well as the US before the 
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global financial crisis had begun. Our results confirm that in respect of housing price 
boom-bust cycles.  Housing markets valuations of these countries show three different 
patterns since 1995. Most of them had experienced housing price boom-bust cycle (e.g. 
Denmark, Greece and Ireland), some of boom countries did not have a bust (e.g. Austria, 
Finland and Sweden), and a few of the EU countries had limited fluctuations only (e.g. 
Germany and Luxembourg). A complete listing of this separation for our sample can be seen 
in Table 3. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.2.Baseline Macroeconomic Specification 
It is known that there are multiple interactions between housing markets and the 
major macroeconomic variables. There is a wide agreement on the drivers of prices in the 
housing markets include income, population, monetary aggregates and credit availability. 
Following this line, we first try to understand the movements of housing prices in this 
subsection. Results of this subsection also forms the basis of our subsequent analysis of the 
relationship between housing price cycles and financial development indicators. 
Our specification considers the associations between the binary variable BOOM and the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita (GDPPCGR), annual real growth rate of M2 money supply 
(M2GRREAL), annual growth rate of cross-border credit flows for the world economy 
(CROSSBORDER), annual growth rate of population (POPGR), age dependency ratio for young 
population (AGEDEPYOUNG), ratio of gross savings to GDP (GROSSAVGDP) and ratio of 
domestic credit extended to private sector to GDP (DOMCREPRIVSEC). Then, we change our 
dependent variable to RAPID, SLOW and BUST one at a time and investigate their associations 
with the same regressors. In this specification, growth rate of M2 money supply and cross-border 
credit flows are meant to handle domestic liquidity and international liquidity, respectively. Note 
that, in an attempt to reveal more, we estimate three versions of each probit regression, namely 
for the full sample (ALL), for boom-bust countries only (BB) and for boom-non-bust countries 
only (Non-BB). By definition, BUST could not be used as a dependent variable for the boom-
non-bust sub-sample. As to potential multi-collinearity of regressors, it must be noted that the 
highest correlations exist between POPGR and DOMCREPRIVSEC (0.59) and between 
GDPPCGR and CROSSBORDER (0.60), both only coinciding with the conventional threshold 
of 60 percent (Table 4). 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
Growth rate of GDP per capita, being indicative of an increase in life-time income 
growth, display a positive association with boom periods in the case of all as well as boom-bust 
economies. Apart from its negative association with episodes of rapid price increase for boom-
non-bust economies, it has no statistical significance in Table 5. On the other hand, the rate of 
population growth, as a potential determinant of housing demand, has a significant positive 
association with boom episodes. This relationship is driven chiefly by episodes of rapid price 
increase. Dependency ratio of young people has a positive linkage with increasing house prices, 
as well. An increasing dependency ratio for young people has been interpreted as a sign of 
expanding households which might ultimately translated into demand for additional housing. 
Gross savings to income ratio displays a positive relationship with increasing house prices and a 
negative one with falling house prices. Examination of sub-sample estimates suggests that it is 
mainly associated with episodes of slow price increase. In a nutshell, these findings lend support 
to the role of real macroeconomic factors in the formation of housing price cycles. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
On the financial front, boom periods have a significant positive association with cross-
border credit flows with varying degrees of significance. This is quite intuitive as cross-border 
credits might have fueled the housing prices in our sample period. However, this finding is not 
preserved when the boom periods are reconsidered based on the pace of price changes. When we 
consider the periods of rapid price increase, cross-border credits matter only in the case of boom-
non-bust countries and when we consider the periods of slow price increase, cross-border credits 
are significant for all as well as boom-bust economies. For the bust episodes we reveal a negative 
association with cross-border funds. When we look at the domestic rather than international 
financial markets, we first reveal that the effect of the growth rate of real M2 turns out to be 
positive yet insignificant for the episodes of boom and rapid price increase. For the episodes of 
slow price increase, it has insignificant negative coefficients. Bust episodes, on the other hand, 
are negatively associated with real M2 growth in a statistically significant manner. Second, 
domestic credit to private sector has a negative association with boom episodes for all of the 
boom, boom-bust and boom-non-bust countries. However, this negative association seems to be 
intact for the whole sample as well as boom countries in the case of rapid episodes and for the 
boom-non-bust countries in the case of slow episodes. Bust episodes are positively related to 
changes in domestic credit volume. 
An overall assessment of our estimates for liquidity-related indicators suggest that global 
rather than domestic liquidity has been shaping the house price cycles of the last decade. In that, 
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likelihood of house price hikes are higher when more funds are available from abroad, as 
suggested by the positive sign of cross-border credit flows. In a congruent manner, cross-border 
credits negatively affect the likelihood of bust episodes. Reversal of the ample cross-border 
liquidity of the earlier half of 2000s in the second half might then be viewed among the main axes 
of the latest global financial crisis. Weak association of real money growth can consequently be 
seen as an extension of this finding. It is further interesting that, availability of domestic credit 
has different effects on housing price cycles as compared to that of cross-border credits. While 
cross-border credits increase the likelihood of housing price increases regardless of the pace, 
domestic credits decrease the likelihood of rapid episodes and increase the likelihood of slow 
episodes, when we focus on the whole sample as well as boom countries. For the bust episodes, 
availability of cross-border credits seem to be a relief factor as opposed to domestic credits. All 
in all, usual suspects of housing price booms and busts are still suspects as verified by our probit 
estimates. 
What is unusual here is we reveal that the earlier practice of treating a boom episode as a 
uniform object of analysis might be misleading. As documented in Table 5, estimated statistical 
associations among variables differ between rapid and slow sub-periods of an episode of boom, 
i.e. the very same factors are associated with likelihoods of rapid and slow episodes quite 
differently. 
 3.3.Financial Development and Housing Price Cycles 
There are many studies suggesting that a strong and well-functioning financial sector 
helps economic growth and job creation. Financial development, yet, is hard to quantify due to 
its complexity. The most comprehensive set of indicators has been prepared by Cihak et al. (2012) 
so as to characterize and benchmark financial systems, where these measures are grouped under 
the titles of financial depth, financial stability, financial efficiency and financial access and 
presented as a 4-by-2 matrix of financial system characteristics. These indicators are included in 
the analysis of this subsection, except for those pertaining to financial access which are not 
available for all countries of interest. 
Keeping our earlier notation, we now use an equation of the form
Pr( 1| , ) ( )
it it it it
Y X Z F x z u     , where 
it
Y  is the binary dependent variable (BOOM, RAPID, 
SLOW or BUST), 
it
x  is a matrix of macroeconomic determinants with its coefficient vector   
(not reported in Table 6) and 
it
z  is the matrix of financial development variables with the 
corresponding coefficient vector  . Maintaining the specification of the previous subsection at 
the core, one financial development measure has been used as an additional regressor at a time. 
In addition to estimating an array of models for the whole sample, we separately consider Greece, 
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Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) subsample to gain further insights. Results of this 
exercise are summarized in Table 6. Our emphasis on GIIPS economies originates from the 
apparent difficulties they recently faced. Below we elaborate Table 6 based on the grouping of 
indicators due to Cihak et al. (2012). Whenever possible, we extend our discussion so as to make 
separate references to financial institutions and financial markets. 
Financial Depth 
Financial depth indicators show the size of the financial sector (e.g. size of banks, other 
financial institutions, and financial markets) relative to the economy. Countries with deep 
financial systems are supposed to have adequate credit and other financial services. Here we 
measure the financial depth of institutions using the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks 
to GDP (PCDMBAFIGDP)  and the ratio of assets to (for both deposit banks and other financial 
institutions) GDP. While measuring financial depth for financial markets, we focus on the two 
main segments of the financial markets and consider the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP (SMCGDP), stock market total value traded to GDP (SMTVTGDP) and private as well as 
public bond market capitalization to GDP (PRIVBMCGDP and PUBMCGDP).  
Having a look at the association of financial depth indicators related to financial 
institutions with our episodes, it is seen that the private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
ratio has a negative association with boom and rapid episodes and a positive association with bust 
episodes (row 1). The same is valid when we consider the private credit provided by other 
financial institutions in relation to GDP (row 2), financial system deposits to GDP ratio (row 3) 
and deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio (row 4). Findings about the other financial 
institutions’ assets to GDP ratio (note that the likelihood function turned out to be non-convergent 
in the GIIPS sub-sample for this variable-row 5) and deposit money bank assets to bank assets 
ratio (row 6) are congruent with these observations, yet they lack statistical significance. Overall, 
there is a clear-cut association between housing price episodes and depth indicators. The 
observation that price increases (decreases) in housing markets are negatively (positively) related 
to depth of financial institutions is indicative of the stabilizing, or correcting, role of more 
developed financial institutions on housing prices. In other words, the deeper the markets with 
respect to financial institutions, the smaller the house price movements are; i.e. a large sale of 
housing will not move the housing prices much. 
The same picture, nevertheless, is not valid in the case of the depth of stock markets. As 
compared to depth of financial institutions, the evidence in the case of stock market depth is 
mixed. Here, the stock market capitalization in relation to GDP (row 7) has a significant and 
positive sign in the case of slow episodes in the whole sample; whereas the stock market total 
value traded to GDP ratio is positively associated with slow and bust episodes and in the whole 
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sample only (row 8). Such lack of a strong association between these indicators and housing price 
episodes are not surprising though, since bank- rather than equity-finance, is the dominant mode 
of finance, as well as housing finance in European countries.  
Turning our attention to bond issues by private and public sectors and to international 
debt issues, interesting findings come out. Having a look at the capitalization of bond market in 
relation to GDP, it is observed that private bond market capitalization has a positive linkage with 
the bust episodes for both the whole sample and the GIIPS sub-sample (row 9). Public bond 
market capitalization, on the other hand, is positively linked to boom and rapid episodes in the 
case of GIIPS economies only (row 10). 
It is viable that declining housing prices (i.e. bust) causes a decline in housing supply, 
suppresses the collateral values of mortgages hence jeopardizing the receivables of private 
institutions. A higher capitalization of private bond market in relation to GDP is then likely to 
follow such financing difficulties (row 9). The case of the public bond market, on the other hand, 
calls for a different story. We know that expansionary fiscal policy, high public debt and the 
associated roll-over requirements in GIIPS economies than EU average. These developments 
resulted in elevation of purchasing power and expansion of consumption demand especially 
directed toward durables, particularly housing.  The positive association between public bond 
market capitalization and boom/rapid episodes in GIIPS economies, where public bonds have 
been issued much more than EU average before crisis2 can be seen as a direct consequence. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Finally, international debt issues to GDP ratio (row 11) has a negative association with 
the boom and rapid price episodes and a positive association with the bust episodes. This 
observation is valid for the whole sample as well as the GIIPS economies. As the ability to issue 
international debt helps economies to extend their average debt maturity, it might have a 
tranquilizing effect on housing prices, i.e. decreasing the likelihood of a housing price boom and 
increasing the probability of a bust. 
Financial Efficiency 
In an ideally efficient banking system, lower bank cost-to-income and bank overhead 
costs to total assets ratios are expected. These two, indeed, boil down to a narrower net interest 
margin, i.e. a smaller difference between the lending and borrowing rates. In Table 6, net interest 
margin (row 12) has a significant positive relationship with the likelihood of a boom (GIIPS sub-
sample), a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of slow episodes (whole sample) 
                                                 
2For example, total public bond issue in Greece has increased three times than that of the EU average. See 
IMF (2003b, p.121) and IMF (2010, p.16). 
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and a strong negative association with the likelihood of bust episodes for GIIPS sub-sample. This 
lends support to the view that financers had to operate within wider interest margins in order to 
overcome various costs they faced. In parallel with this finding, bank overhead costs in relation 
to their total assets (row 14) have a positive linkage with boom and rapid price episodes where 
the coefficient estimate for the former is significant in the case of GIIPS economies and for the 
latter in the case of whole sample. As to bust episodes, a strongly negative relationship between 
overhead costs and the likelihood of a bust has been estimated. 
The stock market turnover ratio (row 15), however, does not suggest any strong pattern 
of relationships, except that it is positively associated with slow episodes in the whole sample. 
Dominance of bank rather than equity finance in European countries, except the UK, once again, 
can be seen as the main driver of this finding. 
Financial Stability 
A common measure of financial stability is the z-score.3 In Table 6, bank z-score (row 
16) is positively associated with rapid episodes and negatively associated with bust episodes in 
the whole sample. This indicator does not display any significant relationships in the GIIPS sub-
sample. The positive linkage of z-score to rapid episodes is quite intuitive, as more attractive and 
stable rates of return accompanied, or resulted from, the fast upward trend of housing prices in 
the earlier phase of booms. In that, the disappearance of the relationship between bank z-scores 
and housing prices in slow episodes is also meaningful and it might be read as a signal of satiation 
for returns once the rapid phase of booms has been over. As bank returns fall and volatility of 
returns increase during busts, the negative association of z-scores and the likelihood of bust 
episodes is intuitive, as well. 
4.Concluding Remarks 
Economic dynamics related to housing sector gained an ever high visibility during and in 
the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis. Owing to high income multiplier in the 
construction sector and capability of housing sector to mobilize tremendous volume of credits as 
well as stock market transactions, the recent price boom-bust experience in housing sector 
resulted in the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. Having appeared initially in 
the second half of 2007, the global crisis was declared in 2008. The following years, then, 
witnessed a deep global recession and persistently high unemployment rates in many countries.  
It is then evident that asset price busts affect the economies adversely over many dimensions, as 
was earlier reported by IMF (2003a). So we focus on the formation and dissolution of housing 
                                                 
3 It explicitly compares buffers (capitalization and returns) with risk (volatility of returns) to measure a 
bank’s solvency risk. The z-score is defined as z ≡ (k+μ)/σ, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, μ 
is return as percent of assets, and σ is standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return volatility 
(Cihak, 2012, p.29). 
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price booms and analyze the factors associated with them using a slightly different perspective 
than that of the recent literature. 
Our numerical approach differs from those in existing literature as we use a simple and 
transparent methodology (Ball, 1994) to identify the turning points of housing price cycles so as 
to obtain the rapid and slow sub-phases of booms and we relate housing boom-bust cycles to 
financial development. In an attempt to understand what has happened in the case of the most 
problematic economies, we developed our analysis in a way to treat GIIPS economies separately. 
Using quarterly data from 1995Q1-2013Q3 for 28 countries we identify the housing price cycles 
and categorize our sample countries as boom countries and boom-bust countries. Our results 
confirm that the majority of them have faced with housing boom-bust cycle, while most 
of housing markets of European countries as well the US were overvalued since 1995. 
Then, we use a panel probit approach to reveal the factors associated with housing price booms 
and busts from 2000 to 2012 for 26 countries for which a boom period has been identified. 
Our findings point at the broad and intuitive observation that both macroeconomic factors 
and the level of financial development are important in the formation as well as dissolution of 
housing price booms. At a glance, these are theoretically expected results, e.g. with growing 
liquidity in domestic markets, housing demand increases because of the decrease in cost of 
funding for housing buyers in an economy. However, it is not possible for supply of housing to 
simultaneously increase. Thus, lack of supply speeds up housing prices. These must be positively 
associated with boom periods. In addition, the findings show that financial institutions are also 
crucial to provide price stability for housing markets because they shape distribution of resources 
to housing markets by determining the ratio of down payments to value applies and loan to income 
ratio etc.  In other words,  as long as  financial institutions influence not only size of the total 
credit pie in housing markets, but also usage rate, it is possible to prevent both  speed price 
increases and  overvalued prices for housing markets, even if  money supply is increased in the 
economy.   
In the financial development front, we can highlight (1) financial institutions’ depth has 
a stabilizing or correcting role, whereas the same is not valid in the case of stock market since 
bank- rather than equity-finance is the dominant mode of finance in a majority of the sample 
countries, (2) public bond market capitalization has been de-stabilizing in the case of GIIPS 
economies, where the public debt securities  have been issued much more than EU average before 
crisis and (3) financial efficiency, financial stability and other measures of interest have their 
expected signs, i.e. the higher the financial efficiency and financial stability are, the less volatile 
are the housing price movements. Consequently, there is evidence of a significant link between 
house price cycles and financial variables, especially monetary variables in the countries 
14 
considered. It seems that policy makers can affect the speed of increase in housing prices and 
remove or mitigate the probability of housing price boom (bust) with monetary policy tools. 
However, the use of these tools did not have efficacy in the housing markets of the EU countries, 
especially Eurozone, as in most of countries. On the contrary, in the markets of Eurozone where 
there is a single monetary policy and eighteen fiscal policies and also where the national 
characteristics in housing markets are still kept, the monetary policy implemented by the ECB 
might have induced the housing price cycles. Indeed, some countries of Eurozone (e.g. Ireland 
and Spain) had experienced this situation before the others faced with housing price booms. 
At the heart of our findings lies the observation that some of the reported relationships 
which are valid for boom episodes are not preserved for the sub-episodes with rapid and slow 
increase in housing prices. A similar observation holds for the GIIPS versus non-GIIPS sub-
samples in our analysis of financial development, where some relationships have been revealed 
for the sample of all countries, some relationships are underlined in the case of GIIPS economies 
only. Therefore, it is quite possible to obtain some generally acceptable conclusions as to the 
factors associated with housing price cycles. Yet it is hard to reach a characterization of housing 
price cycles which is valid for every different period and/or different group of countries. The art 
of macroeconomic policymaking, then, is supposed to provide various recipes to differing 
economies. This statement by itself has the potential to pose further questions which are left as 
part of our future research agenda.  
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Figure 1. Housing and Equity Prices Declines (number of cases) 
 
Source: IMF (2003:68). 
§ 
Figure 2. A Pictorial Overview of the Dating Procedure Employed 
 
I: using the approach due to Ball (1994) the trough 
(square) and peak (circle) points of change in prices are 
found – bottom panel. (t0,t1) is marked as a rapid 
increase (RAPID) period. 
II: the peak point (triangle) of the price series is identified 
– top panel. (t1,t2) is marked as a slow increase (SLOW) 
episode. 
RAPID and SLOW episodes together, (t0,t2) are viewed 
as BOOM episodes. 
III: the period during which the price falls from its peak 
point to a tranquil state. (t2,t3) is marked as a BUST 
episode – top panel. 
In our implementation, the top and bottom panels include 
the level of real housing prices and the seven-quarter 
centered moving average of the quarterly real housing 
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Table 1. Table 1. Data and Variables 
Description Name Source 
QUARTERLY DATA 
Residential property prices at current prices 
See Appendix A for 
variations. 
European Central Bank, EUROSTAT, 
Federal Reserve Economic Data - FRED, 
National statistics offices 
Consumer prices 
ANNUAL DATA 
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita (%) GDPPCGR 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
Annual growth rate of real M2 aggregate of money (%) M2GRREAL 
Annual growth rate of population (%) POPGR 
Age dependency ratio for young population (%) AGEDEPYOUNG 
Ratio of gross savings to GDP (%) GROSSAVGDP 
Ratio of domestic credit extended to private sector to 
GDP (%) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC 
Global risk appetite (%, average), Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, implied 
volatility of S&P 500 index options 
VIX 
Bloomberg 
Annual growth rate of cross-border credit flows (world, 
%, average) 
CROSSBORDER IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
BIS, Bank of International Settlements 
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) PCDMBGDP 
World Bank, The Global Financial 
Development Database. 
See Cihak et al. (2012) for detailed 
descriptions of data items. 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP (%) 
PCDMBAFIGDP 
Financial system deposits to GDP (%) FSDGDP 
Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%) DMBAGDP 
Other financial institutions assets to GDP (%) OFIAGDP 
Deposit money bank assets to (deposit money + central) 
bank assets (%) 
DMBABA 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) SMCGDP 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) SMTVTGDP 
Private bond market capitalization to GDP (%) PRIVBMCGDP 
Public bond market capitalization to GDP (%) PUBBMCGDP 
International debt issues to GDP (%) IDUGDP 
Net interest margin (%) NIM 
Bank cost to income ratio (%) BCI 
Bank overhead costs to total assets (%) BOCTA 
Stock market turnover ratio (%) SMTR 
Bank z-score BZ 
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) LLGDP 
Bank ROA BROA 
Bank ROE BROE 
§ 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics* 
Variable Obs Mean StDev Min Max 
GDPPCGR 337 1.8634 3.9882 -17.5453 14.9779 
M2GRREAL 326 6.5800 11.2939 -19.7290 100.0713 
CROSSBORDER 364 5.7778 6.8025 -6.6953 18.1388 
POPGR 333 0.4334 0.6865 -1.9110 3.0129 
AGEDEPYOUNG 338 25.2437 3.7377 19.2784 35.7324 
GROSSAVGDP 327 20.0806 6.3111 0.0107 40.5030 
DOMCREPRIVSEC 328 112.0637 60.3950 12.2725 319.4609 
(*) Individual post-1999 samples  
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Figure 3. Real House Price Episodes 
 





































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Frequencies of Episodes (2000-2012) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
§ 
Table 3. Classification of Countries  
Eurozone Non-Eurozone Other 
   Austria*    Italy**    Bulgaria**    United States** 
   Belgium*    Luxembourg    Czech Republic**    Iceland** 
   Cyprus**    Malta**    Denmark**    Norway* 
   Estonia**    Netherlands**    Hungary**  
   Finland*    Portugal**    Latvia**  
   France**    Slovakia**    Lithuania**  
   Germany    Slovenia**   
   Greece**    Spain**    Sweden*  
   Ireland**     United Kingdom**  
All countries but those marked with (*) experienced a BOOM. (**) indicates countries experienced a BUST (i.e.boom-bust 
countries). 
§ 
Table 4. Correlations among Variables 
 GDPPCGR M2GRREAL POPGR GROSSAVGDP DOMCREPRIVSEC 
M2GRREAL 0.4285     
POPGR -0.2508 -0.0157    
GROSSAVGDP 0.1388 0.0680 -0.0237   
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.3839 -0.1229 0.5991 -0.2372  








































Table 5. Associations of Housing Price Cycles with Macroeconomic Factors 
 Dependent Variable 
 BOOM (RAPID+SLOW) RAPID 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB 
GDPPCGR 0.1018** 0.1242* -0.2165 0.0489 0.0569 -0.2228* 
 (0.039) (0.074) (0.287) (0.209) (0.206) (0.080) 
M2GRREAL 0.0092 0.0130 -0.0332 0.0070 0.0066 -0.0644 
 (0.317) (0.250) (0.351) (0.426) (0.505) (0.164) 
CROSSBORDER 0.0599*** 0.0768*** 0.1378* 0.0228 0.0235 0.1330** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.076) (0.219) (0.299) (0.027) 
POPGR 0.4495* 0.5902** -4.1528 0.4314** 0.5270*** -3.9322** 
 (0.057) (0.036) (0.184) (0.025) (0.009) (0.038) 
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.0891** 0.1189** -2.5172*** 0.0516 0.0703** 0.2581* 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.000) (0.117) (0.027) (0.076) 
GROSSAVGDP 0.0637*** 0.0827*** -0.2362* 0.0146 0.0254 0.0318 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.095) (0.367) (0.245) (0.638) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.0100*** -0.0124*** -0.2008*** -0.0104*** -0.0124*** 0.0291* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.065) 
CONSTANT -3.5923*** -4.7256*** 93.7903*** -1.7695** -2.2904** -9.2655** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032) (0.013) (0.031) 
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 293 236 57 
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21 5 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-145.39*** -105.94*** -25.47*** -135.45*** -99.84*** -28.15 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.4207) 
 Dependent Variable 
 SLOW BUST 
 7 8 9 10 11  
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB  
GDPPCGR 0.0563 0.0386 0.0523 0.0161 0.0278  
 (0.196) (0.493) (0.693) (0.676) (0.445)  
M2GRREAL -0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0086 -0.0673*** -0.0603***  
 (0.715) (0.911) (0.819) (0.000) (0.000)  
CROSSBORDER 0.0693*** 0.0994*** -0.0050 -0.0350* -0.0565***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.922) (0.095) (0.006)  
POPGR 0.0379 0.0157 -1.2761 0.2924 0.1363  
 (0.850) (0.947) (0.411) (0.405) (0.619)  
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.0148 0.0343 -0.1284 -0.3496*** -0.2241**  
 (0.615) (0.358) (0.412) (0.000) (0.018)  
GROSSAVGDP 0.0520*** 0.0622 0.1282** -0.0841*** -0.0358  
 (0.003) (0.011)** (0.049) (0.007) (0.164)  
DOMCREPRIVSEC 0.0020 0.0010 -0.0100 0.0236*** 0.0170***  
 (0.409) (0.747) (0.508) (0.000) (0.002)  
CONSTANT -3.2656*** -4.0923*** 0.7435 6.9823*** 4.1925**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.863) (0.001) (0.037)  
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 291 234  
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-119.36*** -86.97*** -26.51 -97.28*** -89.79***  
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.4626) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
p-values are provided in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 
percent, respectively. BB stands for countries that experienced a boom followed by a bust (21 countries) and NON-





Table 6. Estimates with Financial Development Variables 
  BOOM RAPID SLOW BUST 
  All GIIPS All GIIPS All GIIPS All GIIPS 
 FINANCIAL DEPTH 
 Financial Institutions 
1 PCDMBGDP -0.0095** -0.0256*** -0.0074*** -0.0183 0.0004 -0.0073 0.0196*** 0.0141*** 
2 PCDMBAFIGDP -0.0082** -0.0256*** -0.0062*** -0.0183 0.0003 -0.0073 0.0188*** 0.0141*** 
3 FSDGDP -0.0071* -0.0524*** -0.0050* -0.0521*** -0.0004 -0.0087 0.0321** 0.0356*** 
4 DMBAGDP -0.0088** -0.0285*** -0.0063*** -0.0252* 0.0002 -0.0078 0.0194*** 0.0173*** 
5 OFIAGDP -0.0056** NA -0.0038 NA -0.0010 NA 0.6890 NA 
6 DMBABA -0.0024 -0.3140** -0.0138 -0.0909 0.0180 -0.0466 0.0271 0.1102 
 Financial Markets 
7 SMCGDP 0.0012 -0.0045 -0.0035 -0.0004 0.0058*** 0.0023 0.0006 0.0029 
8 SMTVTGDP -0.0002 0.0050 -0.0021 0.0032 0.0025* 0.0026 0.0037* -0.0012 
9 PRIVBMCGDP -0.0036 -0.0127 -0.0022 -0.0082 0.0005 -0.0057 0.0134*** 0.0169** 
10 PUBBMCGDP 0.0081 0.0268** 0.0063 0.0179** 0.0024 0.0058 -0.0005 -0.0115 
11 IDUGDP -0.0085** -0.0531*** -0.0059** -0.0326** -0.0002 -0.0309* 0.0103*** 0.0228*** 
 FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY 
 Financial Institutions 
12 NIM -0.0992 0.7689* 0.0426 0.3869 -0.2355*** 0.0252 -0.0891 -0.6144* 
13 BCI 0.0267*** 0.0247 0.0215*** 0.0111 0.0109 0.0091 -0.0325*** -0.0220* 
14 BOCTA 0.0413 0.9886** 0.1276* 0.2947 -0.1437* 0.1205 -0.5893*** -0.8745*** 
 Financial Markets 
15 SMTR 0.0011 0.0046 -0.0018 0.0029 0.0040** 0.0036 0.0035 -0.0023 
 FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 Financial Institutions 
16 BZ 0.0190 0.0288 0.0188* 0.0217 0.0049 0.0033 -0.0698** -0.0372 
All and GIIPS indicate the whole sample and the GIIPS sub-sample, respectively. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical 
significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent (also shown in shades), respectively. Model details and p-values are not 




Appendix A: Data Codes for Housing and Consumer Prices 
Table A1.Data Codes for Housing and Consumer Prices 
 Nominal House Prices Consumer Prices 
Austria  ECB: RPP.Q.AT.N.TD.00.3.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.AT.N.000000.4.INX 
Belgium  ECB: RPP.Q.BE.N.ED.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.BE.N.000000.4.INX 
Bulgaria  ECB: RPP.Q.BG.N.EF.LC.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.BG.N.000000.4.INX 
Cyprus  ECB: RPP.Q.CY.N.TD.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.CY.N.000000.4.INX 
Czech 
Republic 
 ECB: RPP.Q.CZ.N.EF.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.CZ.N.000000.4.INX 
Denmark  ECB: RPP.Q.DK.N.TH.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.DK.N.000000.4.INX 
Estonia  ECB: RPP.Q.EE.N.TF.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.EE.N.000000.4.INX 
Finland  ECB: RPP.Q.FI.N.ED.00.3.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.FI.N.000000.4.INX 
France  ECB: RPP.Q.FR.N.ED.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.FR.N.000000.4.INX 
Germany  ECB: RPP.Q.DE.N.TH.00.5.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.DE.N.000000.4.INX 
Greece  ECB: RPP.Q.GR.N.TF.00.3.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.GR.N.000000.4.INX 
Hungary  ECB: RPP.Q.HU.N.ED.CC.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.HU.N.000000.4.INX 
Iceland  National Statistics Office, Residential property 
market price index from 2000 
 National Statistics Office, Consumer price index 
from 1939 [1988=100] 
Ireland  ECB: RPP.Q.IE.N.TD.00.3.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.IE.N.000000.4.INX 
Italy  ECB: RPP.Q.IT.N.TD.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.IT.N.000000.4.INX 
Latvia  ECB: RPP.Q.LV.N.TF.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.LV.N.000000.4.INX 
Lithuania  ECB: RPP.Q.LT.N.TD.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.LT.N.000000.4.INX 
Luxembourg  ECB: RPP.Q.LU.N.TF.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.LU.N.000000.4.INX 
Malta  ECB: RPP.Q.MT.N.TD.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.MT.N.000000.4.INX 
Netherlands  ECB: RPP.Q.NL.N.ED.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.NL.N.000000.4.INX 
Norway  National Statistics Office, House price index 
[2005=100] 
 National Statistics Office, Consumer Price Index 
[1998=100] 
Portugal  ECB: RPP.Q.PT.N.TD.00.5.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.PT.N.000000.4.INX 
Slovakia  ECB: RPP.Q.SK.N.ED.00.2.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.SK.N.000000.4.INX 
Slovenia  ECB: RPP.Q.SLOW.N.ED.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.SLOW.N.000000.4.INX 
Spain  ECB: RPP.Q.ES.N.TD.00.3.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.ES.N.000000.4.INX 
Sweden  ECB: RPP.Q.SE.N.ED.00.1.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.SE.N.000000.4.INX 
UK  ECB: RPP.Q.GB.N.TD.00.3.00  Eurostat: ICP.M.GB.N.000000.4.INX 





Supplement I: List of Real House Price Episodes 
Table S1. Real House Price Episodes* 
          Changes in 




















Austria RAPID 2004Q3* 2006Q1 95.8 104.4 0.33 1.76  7 8.98 1.50 1.44 0.24 
 RAPID 2007Q3 2010Q1 109.8 121.2 0.23 1.67  11 10.37 1.04 1.44 0.14 
 SLOW 2010Q2 2013Q2 123.3 156.9 1.36 0.00  13 27.25 2.27 -1.36 -0.11 
Belgium SLOW 1997Q2 1999Q3 66.0 74.7 0.71 1.06  10 13.21 1.47 0.35 0.04 
 RAPID 2001Q1 2005Q2 77.1 99.0 0.38 2.54  18 28.44 1.67 2.15 0.13 
 SLOW 2005Q3 2007Q3 101.2 118.8 2.46 1.13  9 17.49 2.19 -1.33 -0.17 
Bulgaria RAPID 2002Q1* 2004Q2 49.9 73.2 -0.61 8.85  10 46.81 5.20 9.46 1.05 
 SLOW 2004Q3 2005Q4 81.2 101.6 8.38 2.60  6 25.24 5.05 -5.78 -1.16 
 RAPID 2006Q1 2007Q2 103.1 125.8 2.06 4.48  6 22.07 4.41 2.42 0.48 
 SLOW 2007Q3 2008Q2 129.4 146.0 4.43 -0.20  4 12.89 4.30 -4.62 -1.54 
 BUST 2008Q3 2013Q3 145.7 80.9 -2.01 0.00  21 -44.48 -2.22 2.01 0.10 
Cyprus RAPID 2005Q1 2007Q2 97.8 132.6 1.89 4.63  10 35.61 3.96 2.73 0.30 
 SLOW 2007Q3 2008Q2 137.0 151.0 4.32 1.16  4 10.23 3.41 -3.16 -1.05 
 BUST 2008Q3 2013Q2 150.6 109.9 0.47 0.00  20 -27.00 -1.42 -0.47 -0.02 
Czech Republic RAPID 2005Q4* 2007Q3 100.3 139.3 0.84 5.19  8 38.85 5.55 4.34 0.62 
 SLOW 2007Q4 2008Q3 141.6 152.5 4.40 -1.07  4 7.71 2.57 -5.47 -1.82 
 BUST 2008Q4 2013Q2 149.4 111.0 -1.51 0.00  19 -25.71 -1.43 1.51 0.08 
Denmark RAPID 1995Q1* 1997Q3 52.6 65.5  2.25  11 24.55 2.46 2.25 0.22 
 SLOW 1997Q4 2001Q1 66.1 78.3 1.88 0.82  14 18.32 1.41 -1.06 -0.08 
 RAPID 2002Q2 2005Q3 79.3 101.6 0.16 4.51  14 28.16 2.17 4.35 0.33 
 SLOW 2005Q4 2007Q1 108.3 123.8 4.36 0.82  6 14.31 2.86 -3.54 -0.71 
 BUST 2007Q2 2013Q2 123.0 90.6 -0.05 0.00  25 -26.35 -1.10 0.05 0.00 
Estonia RAPID 2003Q3 2006Q1 61.9 130.8 2.95 8.61  11 111.36 11.14 5.66 0.57 
 SLOW 2006Q2 2007Q1 136.2 160.9 7.71 1.03  4 18.13 6.04 -6.68 -2.23 
 BUST 2007Q2 2009Q4 160.1 74.3 -0.41 -4.55  11 -53.62 -5.36 -4.14 -0.41 
Finland RAPID 1996Q1* 1997Q1 56.3 66.5 1.20 3.35  5 18.26 4.56 2.15 0.54 
 SLOW 1997Q2 2000Q3 68.3 82.6 3.27 -0.27  14 20.90 1.61 -3.54 -0.27 
 SLOW 2002Q1 2004Q2 82.5 95.3 0.93 1.53  10 15.55 1.73 0.60 0.07 
 RAPID 2005Q2 2006Q1 99.0 104.6 1.34 1.58  4 5.64 1.88 0.24 0.08 
France RAPID 1998Q1* 1999Q4 55.2 60.8 0.58 1.74  8 10.26 1.47 1.16 0.17 
 SLOW 2000Q1 2001Q1 62.1 66.0 1.51 1.45  5 6.26 1.56 -0.06 -0.01 
 RAPID 2001Q2 2004Q4 66.8 92.5 1.37 3.17  15 38.41 2.74 1.80 0.13 
 SLOW 2005Q1 2007Q4 95.6 116.2 3.06 -0.09  12 21.57 1.96 -3.16 -0.29 
 BUST 2008Q1 2009Q3 115.5 103.8 -0.61 -0.59  7 -10.09 -1.68 0.02 0.00 
Germany BUST 2001Q1 2002Q2 105.1 101.7 -0.52 -0.56  6 -3.23 -0.65 -0.04 -0.01 
 SLOW 2012Q4 2013Q3 96.4 97.9 0.42 0.00  4 1.58 0.53 -0.42 -0.14 
Greece SLOW 1997Q1 1999Q1 59.4 69.1  1.61  9 16.32 2.04 1.61 0.20 
 RAPID 1999Q2 2001Q3 70.3 85.2 1.60 2.66  10 21.20 2.36 1.06 0.12 
 SLOW 2001Q4 2003Q1 86.6 94.5 2.45 0.78  6 9.17 1.83 -1.66 -0.33 
 RAPID 2003Q4 2006Q1 94.1 106.6 -0.08 2.30  10 13.26 1.47 2.38 0.26 
 SLOW 2006Q2 2006Q4 108.7 113.3 1.85 1.38  3 4.24 2.12 -0.47 -0.23 
 BUST 2007Q1 2013Q3 112.5 68.6 0.72 0.00  27 -39.01 -1.50 -0.72 -0.03 
Hungary RAPID 1998Q3* 2000Q1 49.3 70.6  6.55  7 43.06 7.18 6.55 1.09 
 RAPID 2001Q3 2003Q1 80.7 96.1 1.77 3.07  7 19.13 3.19 1.30 0.22 
 SLOW 2003Q2 2003Q4 99.2 104.2 1.85 1.59  3 5.03 2.52 -0.27 -0.13 
 BUST 2008Q1 2012Q2 96.0 63.0 -0.91 0.00  18 -34.32 -2.02 0.91 0.05 
Iceland RAPID 2001Q4* 2002Q4 68.2 70.8 -0.26 1.77  5 3.80 0.95 2.02 0.51 
 SLOW 2003Q1 2004Q1 72.9 78.3 1.98 2.13  5 7.47 1.87 0.15 0.04 
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 RAPID 2004Q2* 2005Q2 79.5 98.7 2.82 4.83  5 24.14 6.04 2.00 0.50 
 SLOW 2005Q3 2006Q1 103.7 110.4 4.42 2.77  3 6.45 3.23 -1.64 -0.82 
 BUST 2007Q4 2010Q1 118.0 80.2 -0.39 -2.20  10 -32.05 -3.56 -1.81 -0.20 
Ireland RAPID 1995Q3* 1997Q4 35.9 45.5  5.03  10 26.60 2.96 5.03 0.56 
 SLOW 1998Q1 2001Q1 47.7 78.0 4.75 1.59  13 63.36 5.28 -3.16 -0.26 
 RAPID 2002Q1 2003Q2 76.5 86.2 0.76 2.43  6 12.81 2.56 1.68 0.34 
 SLOW 2003Q3 2004Q3 87.7 95.8 2.33 1.66  5 9.26 2.31 -0.68 -0.17 
 RAPID 2004Q4 2006Q2 95.8 109.5 1.53 2.70  7 14.32 2.39 1.17 0.19 
 SLOW 2006Q3 2007Q2 114.0 118.8 2.43 0.48  4 4.20 1.40 -1.95 -0.65 
 BUST 2007Q3 2012Q2 117.5 57.6 -0.54 -2.80  20 -50.95 -2.68 -2.26 -0.12 
Italy RAPID 1999Q1* 2002Q2 77.5 88.6 0.00 1.77  14 14.38 1.11 1.77 0.14 
 RAPID 2003Q2 2005Q1 91.0 98.5 0.66 1.27  8 8.24 1.18 0.61 0.09 
 SLOW 2005Q2 2008Q1 99.6 106.4 1.18 -0.21  12 6.91 0.63 -1.38 -0.13 
 BUST 2008Q2 2013Q2 106.2 87.7 -0.15 0.00  21 -17.39 -0.87 0.15 0.01 
Latvia RAPID 2001Q4* 2002Q4 35.4 78.0 9.78 14.50  5 120.16 30.04 4.72 1.18 
 RAPID 2003Q4 2006Q3 83.7 169.5 0.82 11.69  12 102.54 9.32 10.87 0.99 
 SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q3 187.1 217.4 10.35 0.75  4 16.22 5.41 -9.59 -3.20 
 BUST 2007Q4 2009Q3 199.9 86.6 -2.21 -7.90  8 -56.66 -8.09 -5.69 -0.81 
Lithuania RAPID 2002Q4 2005Q1 53.1 87.8 2.59 10.70  10 65.55 7.28 8.11 0.90 
 SLOW 2005Q2 2007Q3 91.8 183.7 10.55 4.62  10 100.03 11.11 -5.93 -0.66 
 BUST 2008Q2 2010Q3 184.5 97.3 -4.27 -2.02  10 -47.24 -5.25 2.25 0.25 
Luxembourg SLOW 2012Q2 2013Q2 101.3 104.7 0.44 0.00  5 3.36 0.84 -0.44 -0.11 
Malta RAPID 2001Q4* 2004Q2 68.2 96.8 0.79 4.45  11 42.00 4.20 3.66 0.37 
 BUST 2007Q4 2009Q1 99.0 85.5 -1.31 -1.40  6 -13.64 -2.73 -0.08 -0.02 
Netherlands RAPID 1997Q3 1999Q3 60.7 76.3 2.17 3.69  9 25.76 3.22 1.53 0.19 
 SLOW 1999Q4 2008Q1 79.7 106.7 3.67 0.19  34 33.85 1.03 -3.48 -0.11 
 BUST 2008Q2 2013Q3 106.3 77.4 -0.11 0.00  22 -27.15 -1.29 0.11 0.01 
Norway RAPID 1995Q1* 1997Q2 50.2 59.8  2.53  10 19.16 2.13 2.53 0.28 
 RAPID 1998Q2 1999Q3 65.9 72.7 1.67 2.88  6 10.23 2.05 1.20 0.24 
 SLOW 1999Q4 2002Q2 76.0 87.1 2.84 0.30  11 14.63 1.46 -2.54 -0.25 
 RAPID 2002Q3 2006Q3 85.9 113.1 0.04 3.11  17 31.70 1.98 3.07 0.19 
 SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q3 116.9 125.6 2.93 1.09  4 7.41 2.47 -1.84 -0.61 
 RAPID 2010Q4 2011Q4 127.5 136.2 1.27 1.61  5 6.77 1.69 0.34 0.08 
 SLOW 2012Q1 2013Q2 137.7 144.5 1.35 0.00  6 4.98 1.00 -1.35 -0.27 
Portugal RAPID 1996Q3* 1999Q3 90.8 102.4 0.03 1.54  13 12.77 1.06 1.51 0.13 
 SLOW 1999Q4 2001Q2 103.2 107.5 1.40 -0.01  7 4.20 0.70 -1.41 -0.24 
 BUST 2001Q3 2005Q1 107.0 99.0 -0.19 -0.11  15 -7.47 -0.53 0.09 0.01 
 BUST 2010Q2 2013Q3 101.1 88.3 -0.24 0.00  14 -12.62 -0.97 0.24 0.02 
Slovakia RAPID 2005Q2* 2007Q3 97.9 140.3  5.51  10 43.34 4.82 5.51 0.61 
 SLOW 2007Q4 2008Q1 151.6 158.5 4.72 3.61  2 4.53 4.53 -1.11 -1.11 
 BUST 2008Q2 2012Q3 164.8 118.4 1.94 -0.74  18 -28.14 -1.66 -2.68 -0.16 
Slovenia RAPID 2003Q1* 2006Q3 80.4 118.2  4.54  15 47.06 3.36 4.54 0.32 
 SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q4 120.3 137.4 4.00 1.55  5 14.18 3.55 -2.45 -0.61 
 BUST 2008Q1 2009Q3 134.1 118.8 -0.29 -1.25  7 -11.41 -1.90 -0.97 -0.16 
Spain RAPID 1997Q4* 1999Q1 50.5 54.6 0.91 1.67  6 8.02 1.60 0.76 0.15 
 RAPID 1999Q3 2003Q4 56.2 83.9 1.11 3.39  18 49.34 2.90 2.28 0.13 
 SLOW 2004Q1 2007Q3 86.8 112.1 3.38 -0.15  15 29.14 2.08 -3.53 -0.25 
 BUST 2007Q4 2013Q2 109.8 62.5 -0.72 0.00  23 -43.13 -1.96 0.72 0.03 
Sweden RAPID 1996Q4* 1999Q3 56.2 69.0 0.88 2.33  12 22.69 2.06 1.46 0.13 
 SLOW 1999Q4 2001Q1 70.1 79.1 2.19 1.32  6 12.86 2.57 -0.87 -0.17 
 RAPID 2002Q1 2005Q2 79.7 98.7 0.92 2.37  14 23.71 1.82 1.45 0.11 
 SLOW 2005Q3 2007Q4 100.9 123.2 2.35 0.86  10 22.19 2.47 -1.49 -0.17 
United Kingdom RAPID 1998Q2 1999Q2 47.7 49.6 0.71 2.12  5 3.96 0.99 1.41 0.35 
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 SLOW 1999Q3 2000Q1 51.5 55.2 1.97 2.01  3 7.10 3.55 0.04 0.02 
 RAPID 2001Q1 2002Q1 56.3 64.7 1.60 4.68  5 14.87 3.72 3.09 0.77 
 SLOW 2002Q2 2004Q3 67.8 99.4 4.40 2.41  10 46.67 5.19 -1.98 -0.22 
 RAPID 2005Q3 2006Q3 100.1 105.7 0.85 1.87  5 5.67 1.42 1.02 0.25 
 SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q3 109.1 115.0 1.72 -0.27  4 5.42 1.81 -1.99 -0.66 
 BUST 2007Q4 2012Q4 112.7 78.4 -1.73 0.13  21 -30.40 -1.52 1.86 0.09 
United States SLOW 1996Q4 1998Q4 69.3 73.5 0.14 0.76  9 6.03 0.75 0.63 0.08 
 RAPID 1999Q1 2001Q4 73.9 81.7 0.64 1.22  12 10.49 0.95 0.59 0.05 
 SLOW 2002Q1 2002Q3 82.7 84.6 1.11 1.04  3 2.33 1.17 -0.07 -0.03 
 RAPID 2002Q4 2004Q3 85.2 94.5 0.97 1.89  8 10.95 1.56 0.92 0.13 
 SLOW 2004Q4 2006Q4 95.3 104.8 1.81 -0.04  9 10.00 1.25 -1.85 -0.23 
 BUST 2007Q1 2012Q4 103.9 76.6 -0.49 0.27  24 -26.32 -1.14 0.76 0.03 
(*) In each row, start and end dates are given with the corresponding values of real house prices and trend inflation (left panel). 
Total and episode average changes in prices and trend inflation are also displayed (right panel). RAPID, SLOW and BUST 
correspond to episodes of rapidly increasing, slowly increasing and falling real house prices. Asterisks on start dates indicate use 
of judgment and RAPID and SLOW are together called BOOM in our analysis. 
Supplement II: Alternative Estimates of Table 1 
 
 
Table S1. Associations of Housing Price Cycles with Macroeconomic Factors – Baseline Estimates 
 Dependent Variable 
 BOOM (RAPID+SLOW) RAPID SLOW BUST 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB 
GDPPCGR 0.1912*** 0.2508*** -0.0006 0.0742** 0.0817** -0.0222 0.1326*** 0.1672*** 0.0450 -0.0223 -0.0289 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.996) (0.028) (0.042) (0.801) (0.002) (0.004) (0.683) (0.470) (0.348) 
M2GRREAL 0.0169* 0.0211* -0.0131 0.0086 0.0079 -0.0150 0.0032 0.0057 -0.0107 -0.0732** -0.0715*** 
 (0.068) (0.065) (0.620) (0.320) (0.430) (0.523) (0.707) (0.563) (0.726) (0.000) (0.000) 
POPGR 0.6552*** 0.8849*** -3.3503 0.4953*** 0.5908*** -2.4676* 0.2654 0.3938 -1.3358 0.2178 0.1361 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.195) (0.009) (0.004) (0.107) (0.191) (0.116) (0.355) (0.533) (0.672) 
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.0909** 0.1135** -1.6374 0.0498 0.0655 0.1599 0.0054 0.0058 -0.1239 -0.3677*** -0.3062*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.124) (0.132) (0.162) (0.299) (0.855) (0.881) (0.407) (0.000) (0.002) 
GROSSAVGDP 0.0760*** 0.0936*** -0.0313 0.0171 0.0258 0.0495 0.0574*** 0.0602** 0.1271 -0.0935*** -0.0612** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.871) (0.296) (0.298) (0.448) (0.001) (0.024) (0.049) (0.003) (0.046) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.0102*** -0.0122*** -0.1329 -0.0102*** -0.0120*** 0.0148 0.0022 0.0020 -0.0094 0.0246*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.14) (0.001) (0.004) (0.301) (0.353) (0.489) (0.504) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONSTANT -3.7694*** -4.7423*** 59.6208 -1.7142** -2.1272* -6.0997 -2.9329*** -3.1874*** 0.6243 7.3828*** 5.9182*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.156) (0.042) (0.090) (0.151) (0.000) (0.005) (0.880) (0.001) (0.008) 
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 293 236 57 291 234 57 291 234 
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-150.49*** -111.34*** -27.91** -136.20*** -100.38** -31.18 -126.27*** -96.01** -26.51 -98.67*** -93.31*** 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0491) (0.0010) (0.0176) (0.6911) (0.0023) (0.0171) (0.3613) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
p-values are provided in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Table S2. Associations of Housing Price Cycles with Macroeconomic Factors – After Controlling for Global Risk Appetite 
 Dependent Variable 
 BOOM (RAPID+SLOW) RAPID SLOW BUST 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB 
GDPPCGR 0.1421*** 0.1995*** -0.3696* 0.0745** 0.0808* -0.1011 0.0845* 0.1055* -0.0588 0.0612 0.0538 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.077) (0.041) (0.058) (0.352) (0.056) (0.069) (0.640) (0.116) (0.170) 
M2GRREAL 0.0146 0.0178 -0.0361 0.0087 0.0079 -0.0224 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0332 -0.0826*** -0.0811*** 
 (0.128) (0.137) (0.229) (0.321) (0.436) (0.389) (0.953) (0.989) (0.441) (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX -0.0466*** -0.0529*** -0.1452** 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0486 -0.0530*** -0.0644*** -0.0647 0.0954*** 0.0959*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.018) (0.981) (0.950) (0.178) (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) (0.000) (0.000) 
POPGR 0.5941** 0.8291*** -7.6508** 0.4959*** 0.5899*** -3.5295* 0.1785 0.3072 -2.6869 0.2884 0.2240 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009)** (0.004) (0.060) (0.398) (0.229) (0.166) (0.439) (0.520) 
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.1220*** 0.1534*** -0.7224 0.0496 0.0664 0.2236 0.0263 0.0395 -0.0586 -0.4086*** -0.3590*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.451) (0.144) (0.177) (0.193) (0.404) (0.348) (0.713) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROSSAVGDP 0.0737*** 0.0935*** 0.2032 0.0172 0.0260 0.0470 0.0509*** 0.0569** 0.1346** -0.0814** -0.0512* 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.256) (0.297) (0.299) (0.492) (0.004) (0.033) (0.050) (0.015) (0.102) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.0133*** -0.0158*** -0.0752 -0.0102*** -0.0121*** 0.0186 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0057 0.0301*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.420) (0.001) (0.006) (0.240) (0.870) (0.788) (0.705) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONSTANT -2.9754** -3.9816** 29.0183 -1.7208* -2.1162* -6.2910 -1.8158** -2.0224* 0.6991 5.1543** 3.9999* 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.431) (0.053) (0.095) (0.174) (0.040) (0.086) (0.870) (0.021) (0.061) 
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 293 236 57 291 234 57 291 234 
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-145.87*** -107.20*** -24.38 -136.20*** -100.38** -30.22 -120.50*** -90.20*** -25.18 -87.29*** -81.45*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2144) (0.0021) (0.0321) (0.6865) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.3828) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
p-values are provided in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
